![]() The result is that McCain misunderstands the context and motivations behind South Africa’s strategy. The problem with relying on one side of the literature in a case with which the author is not expert is the potential to commit errors and fall victim to bias, a potential evident in this work. ![]() In the end, the apartheid leadership’s laager (circle the wagons) syndrome led to an excessive fear of a communist onslaught from Angola and strategic overreaction. In Namibia, moreover, the apartheid regime’s strategy of placing black allies in power was defeated in 1989, when the Southwest African People’s Organization swept to power in democratic elections. de Klerk to replace Botha and begin the transition to majority rule. ![]() Instead of ensuring the survival of the apartheid regime, for example, Prime Minister-then-President P.W Botha’s “total strategy” of intervening in Angola and Namibia and suppressing domestic opposition inside South Africa backfired and led to a strengthening of international sanctions that helped bring the downfall of the regime and paved the way for President F.W. ![]() McCain’s admiration for the apartheid regime’s strategy relies too much on the narrative of its supporters and does not include other literature at the political and strategic level that would have led to a more accurate and balanced evaluation. ![]()
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